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Abstract 
 
As an orator, writer and former journalist, Australia’s Prime Minister John Curtin led 
significant innovations that transformed the media and created a legacy in political 
communications. Few publications exist on his use of the mass media to secure popular 
support during World War II. This paper aims to take his journalism strategies away from the 
margins, where they have not previously received much scholarly attention. I will investigate 
the question: How did Curtin achieve success in his use of the news media? The paper will 
focus on his groundbreaking initiatives in the press, film and radio. My research will be 
located in the multimethod field of scholarship developed by John Curtin historians such as 
Bobbie Oliver and David Black, political scientist Chris Hubbard, as well as based on the 
theories of journalism experts Steve Mickler and David Pyvis. Within this context, the paper 
will argue that Curtin was a brilliant media strategist, providing valuable lessons for 
managing information needs. 
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Discovering the secrets of a successful mass news media strategist 
“The power of the press is greater than that of the Caesars of the school books, or the 
statesmen of our existing Legislatures”, John Curtin wrote in his Perth newspaper editor’s 
office at The Westralian Worker in 1922. “It shapes and moulds the thought of millions, even 
as the potter shapes the clay spinning on his wheel” (1922). As a forceful orator, skilful writer 
and former hard-hitting journalist, this Australian wartime Prime Minister led significant 
innovations that transformed the nation’s media and created a legacy in global political 
communications. His appointment as the Australian Labor Party (ALP) Prime Minister began 
on 7 October 1941 and his second term ended unexpectedly with his death on 5 July 1945. 
During these years, Curtin initiated twice-daily, confidential news conferences; direct radio 
speeches to his Allied partners, Britain and the United States; and developed more 
independent radio programs, newsreels and movies along with other creative media strategies 
that will be discussed in this paper (Lloyd 1988; Curtin 1942a, 1944; Pyvis 1993; National 
Film & Sound Archive 2008a). 
 
When he became Australia’s leader, the nation was embroiled in political upheavals, a 
foreign war on Nazism and the bitter memories of the deep 1930s economic depression. The 
turmoil escalated with the sudden death of the conservative United Australia Party (UAP) 
Prime Minister, Joseph Lyons, on 7 April 1939. Over the next two-and-a-half years, political 
divisions intensified under the Governments of three successive non-Labor Prime 
Ministers—Earle Page, Robert Menzies and Arthur Fadden—until Curtin was appointed to 
the role during World War II (hereafter the war). Through his ingenious efforts to publicise 
Australian determination to help defeat totalitarian Axis enemies, he achieved his aims to 
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unify a troubled nation and build strong international alliances. His policies gained powerful 
US support, evidenced in a confidential memorandum sent to President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt during the 1942 Pacific battles. The American Legation in Canberra advised 
Roosevelt: 
No other member of the [Australian Federal] Cabinet has stood the test of recent 
months as well as John Curtin. He is today, I believe, trusted and respected 
throughout the Commonwealth because of his obvious sincerity, directness and 
integrity of character (Records of Franklin Roosevelt 1942, p.102). 
The next year a strong majority of voters re-elected Curtin, who achieved the greatest Federal 
victory for the ALP at the time (Black 2008; Oliver 2003). Despite his significant investment 
in public communications, a major gap exists in the literature about his relationships with the 
expanding news media. This article aims to take his journalism strategies away from the 
margins, where they have not previously received much scholarly attention, by investigating 
the following question: How did Curtin achieve such success in his use of the mass news 
media to secure popular support for his international war policies? By focusing on his 
groundbreaking initiatives in the press, film and radio broadcasts, this paper will argue that he 
was a brilliant media strategist due to his persuasive skills in influencing reporters to back his 
foreign policies, providing valuable lessons for managing information needs during global 
conflicts. 
Literature review: delving into Australia’s journalism history 
While many researchers focused on Curtin’s family life and public policies, there has not 
been a comprehensive, scholarly study of his media strategies. Australia was in a critical 
period. Major forces converged with the emergence of another global war, new radio and film 
industries expanded rapidly, and a skilful communicator well-known for his passionately 
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anti-conscription views during World War I was appointed Labor national leader. Yet “there 
is not much of a history of journalism” about the nation, according to Ann Curthoys, Julianne 
Schultz and Paula Hamilton (1992, p.45). Media scholar John Henningham agreed: “After 
200 years of Australian history, we have not produced a comprehensive study of Australian 
journalism” (Cryle 1992, p.101). Significantly, Curtin was recognised as leading Australia in 
an entirely new direction to becoming a fully independent nation, a shift from British 
imperial domination (Black 2004; Coatney 1997; Hubbard 2008; Oliver 2001). 
 
Impelled by Curtin’s directives, the Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) 
management began promoting “Australian speech” instead of the “exaggerated English 
accents” that had been so prevalent since the station began operating in 1932 (Pyvis 1993, 
pp.4, 8). As many wartime, mainstream media owners were conservative, some journalists 
viewed themselves as independently overseeing the Labor Government (Lloyd 1988; 
Petersen 1993). Such news reporters invoked the “Fourth Estate” concept, believing the 
media should autonomously monitor the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of 
government and publish stories deemed to be in the public’s interest. This democratic ideal, 
inspired by the European Enlightenment, was generally upheld in Australian journalism 
although notions of objectivity were set aside by some media owners and commentators 
(Fernandez 2007; Fitzgerald 2008; Lucy & Mickler 2006). 
 
A few scholars wrote of Curtin’s top-secret, twice-daily news briefings, which were more 
frequent than those given by his predecessor, Menzies (Grattan 2000, Lloyd 1988, Lloyd and 
Hall 1997, Ross 1977, Serle 1998). In the US, Roosevelt conducted regular, twice-weekly 
news conferences. Neither the wartime British Prime Minister Winston Churchill nor 
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Canadian leader William Lyon Mackenzie King held daily interviews (King 27 April 1939, 
Lloyd 1988). No researcher has published a detailed analysis of the private notes of wartime 
Canberra correspondents, Joseph Alexander of The Herald (1939-45) and E.H. (Harold) Cox 
of The Sun News-Pictorial (1944-45). Only one book included a discussion of the private 
“off-the-record” reporters’ notes of Frederick Thomas Smith, the Canberra bureau chief of 
Australian United Press during the war (Lloyd and Hall 1997). A review of the literature 
revealed a need to identify Curtin’s successful film, radio and press strategies as well as their 
relevance to contemporary political communications. 
Multimethod approaches 
Through a new examination of rarely viewed primary source documents, it will be shown that 
overall, the mass news media positively portrayed Curtin and his groundbreaking foreign 
policies that aimed at forging a closer connection to the US. Due to a lack of published 
research and Curtin’s personal reminiscences, it was necessary to investigate documents 
provided by his contemporaries. This material included secret diaries, oral histories, 
reporters’ notes, newspapers, confidential Allied memoranda and cables. It was possible to 
assess Curtin’s journalism relationships by finding material in digitised archives at the John 
Curtin Prime Ministerial Library. Therefore the broad theoretical and conceptual approaches 
to this question were derived from media and journalism studies, combined with archival 
research methods developed in the discipline of history. 
 
First, this paper will identify the innovative aspects of Curtin’s media strategies during his 
two terms as Australian Prime Minister. Analyses will be made of relevant wartime 
newspaper reports about his initiatives. This study will be based on the Pew Research 
Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism formula that a press article was deemed 
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“positive” if two-thirds of the statements appeared to support a national leader (2008, Experts 
assess President Obama’s strategy with media 2009). Second, specific examples will be 
investigated pertaining to Curtin’s press relations, newsreel speeches and radio broadcasts. 
His rhetoric will be compared with Roosevelt’s US radio “fireside chats” in terms of the key 
words, accessibility and public impact (Lim 2003, pp.437-64). The newsreel analyses will use 
semiotic film conventions to examine whether the moving images portrayed Curtin as a 
heroic, dynamic and strong leader (Hansen et al. 1998, Lucy and Mickler 2006). Third, the 
Prime Minister’s private discussions will be compared with his public image as revealed in 
“on-the-record” news interviews and media statements. To investigate his journalism contacts 
within the Allied 1940s milieu, his media strategies will be contrasted with those of three 
other democratic leaders of the era: Churchill, Roosevelt and Canada’s Mackenzie King. 
Thus this study will provide an international context to evaluate the closeness of Curtin’s 
journalism relationships and appraise his ability to minimise negative reports and promote 
positive coverage of his Pacific war strategies. 
New findings on prime ministerial-journalism relations 
This multimethod investigation revealed that Curtin set many journalism precedents that 
contributed to his ability to develop favourable relationships with news correspondents. 
Australia’s mass news media favourably promoted the announcement of a new Prime 
Minister, who was appointed after the Labor Opposition and the two Independent 
Parliamentary members voted to reject the conservative Government’s budget on 3 October 
1941. Previously, the fragile UAP-Country Party Coalition Government had depended on the 
support of the two Independents, Arthur Coles and Alex Wilson, to govern with a majority. 
When Coles and Wilson helped to remove the Coalition from office, the Country Party Prime 
Minister at the time, Arthur Fadden, advised the Governor-General, Lord Gowrie, that Curtin 
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should be commissioned to lead the nation. The local press welcomed the news that Curtin 
had become the first Western Australian to be Australia’s Prime Minister. The appointment 
was reported positively in twelve mainstream, metropolitan broadsheets and tabloids 
throughout the country.2
 
 Characterising Australian people’s attitudes towards Curtin, 
newspaper articles included expressions of “loyalty”, “support and cooperation”, “trust”, 
“respect and esteem”, as well as “good wishes” and the affirmation that it was “Labour’s [sic] 
right to govern” (Australian Prime Minister’s Office 4-10 October 1941, np). The press 
owners favoured his victory as a shift from the infighting within the previous UAP-Country 
Party Coalition Government. 
Reporters also emphasised his unique professional background as a former State president of 
a press union, the Australian Journalists’ Association. Through Curtin’s union leadership, in 
1919 the first university classes for professional Australian reporters began in WA, resulting 
in the introduction of a Diploma in Journalism (University of Western Australia 1929, Lloyd 
1985). He had been the editor of the trade union publication, The Timber Worker, in Victoria 
from 1913 until his resignation in 1915, as well as of the labour-oriented Perth newspaper, 
The Westralian Worker, from 1917 until he was elected to be the Federal Member of 
Fremantle in the House of Representatives in 1928 (Black 1995). Even as he became the 
national leader, he recognised the importance of journalism relationships and appointed 
Australia’s first full-time Prime Ministerial press secretary, Don Rodgers, to increase 
communications with Canberra correspondents (Rodgers 1971). In their coverage of the new 
Government, reporters emphasised Curtin was a “journalist by profession”, known for his 
“graceful” sentences and “suave” manner, indicating they viewed him as a colleague 
(Australian Prime Minister’s Office 6 October 1941, np). 
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When his two-month-old administration was confronted by aggressive Axis Japanese forces, 
Curtin initiated new media strategies to ensure citizens’ support for Australia’s role in the 
new Pacific war. To secure journalists’ consensus, he held unprecedented, twice-daily news 
conferences, sharing top-secret war information on a regular basis. Curtin’s Prime Ministerial 
predecessors limited “direct personal contact” with the Parliamentary Press Gallery and only 
released important information directly to editors (Alexander 1971, np). As he briefed senior 
Canberra political correspondents on 1 December 1941 on an expected “attack on Thailand”, 
he trusted they would honour the confidentiality agreement by communicating this news tip 
only to their employers. They abided by the prescribed censorship system. After an interview 
on 5 December, The Herald’s Joseph Alexander noted in his private diary that Rodgers 
“warned us to be ready for the gravest development”. The next day Alexander wrote: “We are 
on the brink of war with Japan”. On 8 December at 6.30am, Rodgers sent a message to 
Alexander about the Japanese bombings on the US naval base of Pearl Harbour, Hawaii, as 
well as on Manila in the Philippines (Alexander 1-8 December 1941, np). Shortly after the 
Pearl Harbour attack, Japanese forces also launched assaults on Hong Kong, the Malay 
peninsula, Midway Island and Guam on 8 December, local time.  
 
Although reputable international media reported the Pearl Harbour disaster as a “surprise 
attack”, Curtin made extraordinary efforts to ensure the Canberra Press Gallery was well 
prepared for the new war on Japan (Japanese planes bomb Pearl Harbor, 1941, Coatney 
2009, p.95, Toto 2001). Also on 8 December he became the first Australian leader to make an 
independent declaration of war over a radio broadcast (Oliver 2001). Speaking to “Men and 
women of Australia”, he affirmed: “This is our darkest hour” (Curtin 1941a, np). The next 
day his announcement was publicised as “vital” on page one of The Sydney Morning Herald; 
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as “important” on the cover of The Age; as well as endorsing “[d]rastic plans” and “a total 
war footing” in The Canberra Times lead. His speech was copied almost verbatim in The 
Sydney Morning Herald while repeated substantially in The Age, The Canberra Times and 
The West Australian (9 December 1941). As a result of his close press relationships, reporters 
not only honoured the media embargo on enemy military manoeuvres; they positively 
portrayed Curtin as a strong war leader. 
 
As he forged a military alliance with Roosevelt, Curtin wrote a newspaper editorial about 
“Australia looks to America”, resulting in an “immense sensation” in diplomatic, political 
and journalist circles. In his diary, Alexander wrote he requested Curtin to write “a special 
article for the Herald dealing with the outlook for 1942” (28 December 1941). The Herald 
managing editor, Sir Keith Murdoch, did not immediately recognise the impact of the column 
and it was “held for a couple of weeks” until he decided to transfer the copy, originally 
planned for the magazine pages, to the front page of the issue on Saturday, 27 December 
1941 (Black 2006). Rodgers was credited with crafting many media statements (Hall 1998). 
Yet journalists reported Curtin liked to edit and write additional material, sometimes at the 
last minute before publication (The Herald 9 December 1941, The Age 27 July 1943). He 
asserted in the editorial: “Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that 
Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the 
United Kingdom” (1941b, np). The next day Alexander wrote: “The Sunday Telegraph 
pinched it and had it today. Other Sunday papers gave it great publicity and it is being widely 
discussed in England ... KM [Keith Murdoch] is very amazed about it” (28 and 30 December 
1941, np). 
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Many mainstream, daily newspaper owners endorsed Curtin’s assertive policy by publishing 
positive press reports backing his “realism” in Australia, London and New York (Australian 
Prime Minister’s Office 27 December 1941 - 1 January 1942, np).3
 
 Affirming their traditional 
Empire loyalties, a small minority of Australian newspaper publishers initially disapproved of 
these “looks to America” (The Sydney Morning Herald 29 December 1941, 6, The Courier-
Mail 30 December 1941). Soon afterwards, however, journalists acknowledged the US 
Government’s deployment of troops to Australia “vindicated” Curtin’s Pacific war strategies 
(Australian Prime Minister’s Office 1 and 5 January 1942, np). About 90,000 US servicemen 
were in Australia by August 1942. They were either stationed in Australian bases or were in 
transit to New Guinea in accordance with Curtin’s plans (Saunders and Taylor 1995). 
Through his newspaper editorial, he encouraged a vigorous, democratic and informed debate 
of his strategies in the public sphere. 
As the Pacific battles intensified in 1942, Curtin developed new radio strategies that enabled 
him to speak directly to Australian listeners during national emergencies. The first ABC 
Federal reporter, Warren Denning, joined the Press Gallery in 1939. The Curtin 
administration inaugurated a national news service by February 1942 and the ABC began 
employing more overseas correspondents. Commercial radios used ABC wartime bulletins 
free of charge. The bulletins were broadcast three times each day and in a survey, ninety one 
per cent of Australian radio listeners said they heard the news relays regularly (Australian 
Commonwealth Archives Office 3 May 1945, Lloyd 1988, Moses 1982, Petersen 1993). Also 
by 1942, Curtin was releasing important war news directly to radio listeners rather than 
relying on press journalists to communicate information to readers. In an anonymous 
editorial, The Sun proprietor, Frank Packer, questioned Curtin’s reliance on radio by 
publishing the following statement: “Again and again the ABC is used as the first medium of 
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announcements by himself [Curtin] and other members of his Government. This even 
includes the dissemination of war news of the highest importance to the Australian public” 
(Australian Prime Minister’s Office 20 March 1942, np). Defending newspaper institutions, 
Packer warned: “There are also dangers in national broadcasting”. According to the editorial, 
radio addresses were a problem because: “They are less perfectly interpreted by the public, 
and with mistakes in announcing, which are frequent, and mistakes in hearing, which are 
even more common, the radio has far less authority than a reputable newspaper” (Australian 
Prime Minister’s Office 20 March 1942, np). Although Curtin frequently briefed newspaper 
journalists on his initiatives, they were forced to relinquish their information monopoly and 
compete with the new Federal radio reporters. 
 
Packer made his strong stand on press integrity a week after Curtin’s novel radio broadcast to 
an international audience encompassing North America, South America, the British Isles and 
Europe on 14 March 1942 (Curtin 1942a, The Canberra Times 16 March 1942). Curtin was 
able to release an immediate message to international listeners and appeal for their 
cooperation in a stronger war alliance because he had installed a powerful new shortwave 
transmitting station that connected Australian radio networks to the nation (The Canberra 
Times 31 October 1941). Newspaper journalists enthusiastically reported that more than 700 
US radio stations had broadcast his talk during the peak listening hour between 7pm and 8pm 
on Friday. As The West Australian journalist noted, “[t]he stirring speech” was broadcast to 
the “widest network available” and “the largest potential audience ever hooked up for an 
Australian” (16 March 1942, 5). His words were reported positively in the next day’s issues 
of five metropolitan dailies throughout Australia.4 The favourable coverage extended to 
London and the US (The Age and The West Australian 16 March 1942). 
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Along with his leadership in expanding radio broadcasts, press statements and interviews, 
Curtin sponsored a modern, first-class Australian film industry. During the first month of his 
Prime Ministership, he encouraged private filmmakers to produce “Australian shorts” for 
international cinemas. Furthermore, his administration created a national films laboratory to 
process footage, along with transferring the Australian National Publicity Association to New 
York to maximise promotional opportunities (The Canberra Times 31 October 1941). 
Through his support of eye-witness war newsreels, an Australian film team won the country’s 
first Academy Award for a documentary. The award was given to the 1942 film “Kokoda 
Front Line!” that portrayed Australian soldiers fighting in the Kokoda Track in New Guinea 
(Fallows 2005). Although Curtin’s predecessors, Menzies and Fadden, had supported the 
Department of Information, established in 1939 to produce morale-boosting films, archival 
research revealed little newsreel footage of them as Prime Ministers during this era. In 
contrast, Curtin appeared in a “vast” record of moving images and research suggested they 
were screened in other Allied countries (Fallows 2005, National Film & Sound Archive 2008 
a, b, c, np). 
 
In the lead-up to the 1943 Federal election, Curtin became the first party leader to deliver a 
campaign policy speech through a radio hook-up from Canberra (Black 1995). The radio talk 
consolidated his reputation as the nation’s leader and it was favourably reported in The Age, 
The Canberra Times, The Sydney Morning Herald and The West Australian (27 July 1943). 
ALP campaign posters and radio jingle advertisements focused on his popularity in an 
unprecedented way (Oliver 2003). Although two other press owners, Packer and Murdoch, 
had initially endorsed Curtin’s appointment as Prime Minister to resolve the previous 
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political instability, they remained resolutely anti-Labor (Alexander 21 August 1943, 
Whitington 1977). While Curtin enjoyed close professional associations with the Press 
Gallery, his relationships with some newspapers proprietors resembled those of the British 
and US leaders. In an undated letter, Roosevelt wrote to Churchill that their news coverage 
was generally “not so bad” but they were “menaced” by “a handful or two of gentlemen who 
cannot get politics out of their heads in the worst crisis” (Churchill 1950, p.200). Yet on 21 
August, Australian voters elected the Curtin Government by a remarkable landslide. Two 
days later, Don Whitington of The Daily Telegraph, one of Packer’s Sydney newspapers, 
reported: “The Government’s sweeping victory at the polls was a vote of confidence in John 
Curtin” (Prime Minister’s Office 23 August 1943, np). Through his use of radio, Curtin 
marshalled his electoral popularity as a means to achieve a mandate to influence the media, a 
mandate that newspaper proprietors were obliged to respect. The election campaign also 
indicated national radio broadcasts were beginning to eclipse the power of some press 
owners. 
 
Due to the ALP’s significant Parliamentary majority, Curtin was more easily able to 
influence media agendas around the world. In 1944 he made his first international trip as 
Prime Minister to meet Allied leaders and journalists in London, Canada and the US 
(Campbell 2008). Travelling by ship, he and his wife, Elsie Curtin, arrived in San Francisco 
on 19 April, where he was interviewed by sixty one journalists and filmed by five newsreel 
operators. The British Consul General in San Francisco, Godfrey Fisher, wrote that “Mr. 
Curtin made an excellent impression” in a confidential telegram to the British Minister of 
Foreign Affairs to the US, N.M. Butler. “[T]he press showed very great interest in his coming 
and his press conference was described to me as the biggest and best ever held in San 
Francisco”, Fisher noted (Great Britain Foreign Office 1944, pp.2-3). Elsie Curtin conducted 
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press conferences, where she encouraged women to enter professional careers and attracted 
headlines in The New York Times (26 April 1944) and The Washington Post (12 May 1944). 
In London, newspaper journalists praised Curtin’s ability to establish “excellent personal 
relations” with Churchill; his “incisive presentation of the facts”; and his “fresh mind and 
language” during his radio broadcast to Britons on 8 May (Australian Prime Minister’s 
Office, 12 May and 25 May 1944, np, The Canberra Times 9 May 1944, p.2). The next 
month in Canada, Mackenzie King privately noted in his diary that Curtin “seemed to attach 
great importance in the morning to the press interview [in Ottawa]. He came with material 
prepared for distribution, welcomed questions, etc.” Continuing in his diary, King wrote 
Curtin focused “almost exclusively” on Australia’s war effort and the need for a world 
organisation to maintain stability in peacetime (1 June 1944, np). After the interview, 
reporters remarked it was “one of the most useful conferences ever held in the Ottawa [Press] 
Gallery” (Australian Department of External Affairs 1944, np). Through his extensive 
journalism contacts, Curtin succeeded in promoting the urgencies of the Pacific war to other 
Allied audiences fixated on the European battles. 
 
Immediately after his untimely death on 5 July 1945, Curtin’s funeral became an exceptional 
media event. It was the first time that journalists, photographers and camera crews travelled 
from the eastern States to report on a funeral in WA. This was the largest funeral gathering in 
the State’s history at the time. Indeed, Curtin was the first Prime Minister to be buried in WA. 
Until this eulogy, Australian radio listeners had never heard a funeral service broadcast across 
the nation (Australian Prime Minister’s Department 1945). Tributes appeared on newspaper 
front pages around the world.5 “[H]e stepped at a single stride into the first rank of Imperial 
statesman,” reported The Times correspondent in London. The New York Times leader writer 
declared “he was an outspoken advocate for world organisation” and his death was “a loss to 
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this country [the US] and to the world as well as to his own land” (The Sydney Morning 
Herald 6 July 1945, pp.3, 4). The preceding findings indicate his skills in generating positive 
wartime news coverage by encouraging investigative journalism and foreign correspondents, 
as well as developing Australia’s film and radio industries to communicate to global 
audiences. 
Press, radio and film perspectives 
It has been established that Curtin used his professional journalism skills to initiate creative 
mass media strategies to achieve news correspondents’ consensus for Australia’s wartime 
role. His innovations included frequent, top-secret war briefings to senior political reporters, 
as well as expanding Prime Ministerial radio and film broadcasts to communicate to Allied 
audiences across the globe. To discover how Curtin applied his journalism strategies, this 
paper will now investigate his confidential Canberra Press Gallery conferences. For example, 
he secured correspondents’ assurances that they would protect national security and withhold 
publication of his defiance of Churchill when he succeeded in bringing back the 6th and 7th 
Australian Divisions from the Middle East to defend their homeland (Burgoyne 1942, Curtin 
1942b). In their private cables during February 1942, the two Prime Ministers had clashed 
over the allocation of military forces because Churchill planned to divert the same Australian 
troops to fight in Rangoon, Burma (Australian Prime Minister’s Department 1942). At a news 
conference, Curtin showed “the great pile of cables” to the Press Gallery, who supported his 
decision to turn back the troops to Australia (Alexander 1971, np). 
 
The crisis escalated with the Japanese bombing of Darwin on 19 February 1942; the next day 
The Age headline announced: “War Comes Home To Australia” (p.2). Joseph Alexander of 
The Herald recounted, “although we were staggered at the idea of Curtin opposing the will of 
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a man like Churchill at a time like this, we all felt, I think, proud of him, because he was 
determined to put Australia first” (1971, np). During the troops’ return, an ABC radio 
reporter was told of Curtin’s words: “I’m not able to sleep while the boys are on the water” 
(Commins 1971, np). Other journalists learned of his personal struggles and night-time 
Canberra walks. The Sun News-Pictorial correspondent, Harold Cox, remembered that one 
summer evening, he saw Curtin, who paused and exclaimed: “Harold! What would you do if 
you knew the troops’ [defence] equipment was on another [ship] convoy two days behind 
them?” The next evening Cox met Curtin by coincidence again. The journalist remarked to 
Curtin that he looked “a lot better”. Curtin replied: “Yes, I feel a lot better, too. They’re 
coming home” (Cox 1973, np). While biographer, John Edwards, wrote of Curtin’s 
“Sleepless Vigil” (2005, p.1), no researcher has published an analysis of his conversations 
with journalists during this period. In their oral histories, former Press Gallery members cited 
the episode as an example of Curtin’s “intensity and his devotion” to his country (Commins 
1971, np). As a result of his close, private and substantive communications, he established 
Prime Ministerial-press relationships on a new foundation of trust. 
 
An analysis of Curtin’s first US radio broadcast indicated his rhetoric was similar to 
Roosevelt’s popular radio “fireside chats”, often described by scholars as setting the “gold 
standard for American political oratory” (Lim 2003, p.438). Curtin was inspired to give the 
talk to counter “vicious rumours” spread by Ankara and Vichy French radio announcers that 
he would reach a separate armistice with Japan (The West Australian 16 March 1942, 5). On 
Friday evening, 14 March 1942, he chose inclusive words about “the people”, “we” and “us” 
as well as addressing: “Men and women of the United States” (Curtin 1942a). This language 
resembled the approach taken by Roosevelt in his fireside chats, which always began with 
some variant of a greeting to “My Friends” (Lim 2003, p.453). Furthermore, Curtin’s 
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keywords appealed to nationhood—the people united against a common foe—as well as 
ideals such as freedom, hope and a triumphant future. During the broadcast, he spoke about 
one hundred and fifty words a minute, somewhat faster than the prescribed standard but still 
accessible (1942a). Roosevelt’s fireside chats were calculated to be an average of one 
hundred and seventeen words per minute (Lim 2003). 
 
As he broadcast his innovative talk to international radio listeners, Curtin used other 
rhetorical devices to appeal to mass Allied audiences.  Consistent with official US policy, he 
avoided verbal assaults on Japan’s revered Emperor Hirohito, but spoke impersonally about 
“the enemy”, “the aggressor” and “the assassin” (1942a, Brands 2005, p.434). Moreover he 
warned that: “Australia is the last bastion between the West Coast of America and the 
Japanese” (1942a, np). An evaluation was made of the accessibility of the speech, based on 
the Flesch readability score. This formula spanned a hundred-point scale. A higher score 
indicated the speech included simple language. A lower score implied the document was 
more complex. The standard recommended writing score was sixty to seventy (Lim 2003). 
Curtin’s radio talk registered a Flesch readability score of 69.4, well within the recommended 
standard for public audiences (1942a). All of Roosevelt’s twenty-seven fireside chats were 
calculated to be an average of 57.5 on the Flesch readability scale (Lim 2003, pp.445-6). Also 
Curtin’s broadcast was suitable for a seventh-grade audience based on another formula, the 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade (1942a). Many middle-brow newspapers were close to an eighth-grade 
reading level (T. Day 2008). Curtin’s speech attracted positive international news coverage 
because of his inspiring messages, simple language and lively rhetorical pace. 
 
Along with his skilful use of radio to appeal to working people, Curtin deliberately portrayed 
himself as an ordinary Australian in films that transcended social and class barriers, 
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contrasting with the Axis dictators’ notions of superiority. For example an official newsreel, 
screened in an outdoor cinema near Darwin, showed an unpretentious Curtin strolling in his 
modest Cottesloe garden, an image which received spontaneous standing ovations from 
servicemen. This was evidence that he was “Australia personified” for many citizens (D. Day 
2000, p.65). Filmmakers quickly recognised how the war had unified Australians, 
overturning class prejudices, and they cleverly conveyed the phenomenon of everyday people 
accomplishing heroic feats in the battlefields and the homeland (for example, South-west 
Pacific 1943, The Rats of Tobruk 1944). Curtin achieved a forceful image by meticulously 
rehearsing speeches as well as practising facial expressions and gestures. Unused footage 
showed his film rehearsals as he tried different hand gestures, sometimes raising a finger in 
the air to emphasise his messages; adjusted memorised phrases; looked from side to side as if 
he were addressing a news conference; and leaned forward over a table. During these practice 
shots, extending to “take four”, he patiently waited for the director’s clapperboard and the 
call for “action!” (Parliament In Session 1944). 
 
Cinema audiences watched carefully constructed shots that appeared as dynamic, immediate 
news reports, creating a sense of urgency, directness and honesty (Parliament In Session 
1944). In a 1943 newsreel, for example, the narrator said: “The position is tense and the 
Prime Minister minces no words”. Then the director cut to Curtin, who appeared to be talking 
to a group of journalists, unseen in the camera frame. As he learned forward in his chair and 
looked at an invisible audience, he declared: “Gentlemen, the truth is if we do not strip 
ourselves to save for our country, the enemy will do it for us with ruthless efficiency, 
imposing upon us a maximum of misery” (Two Years … Dec. 7 1941-1943 1943). In fact, the 
unedited version showed the director tried medium and close-up shots while Curtin adopted a 
variety of speaking postures during “take three” of this scene (Parliament In Session 1944). 
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Although these moving images were finally screened as medium shots to convey a personal 
relationship with the assumed audience of reporters, the filmmakers often portrayed eye-level 
close-ups to indicate intimacy with moviegoers (for example, Empire Premiers Assemble 
1944, Mrs Roosevelt’s Visit To Canberra 1943, War In Pacific! 1941). Available newsreels 
conveyed his efforts to appear as a candid communicator to cinema audiences. 
Conclusion: media visionary paved the way for current political communications 
During his first days as Prime Minister, Curtin was determined to elevate the Press Gallery 
from the political margins and senior journalists soon became crucial allies in his fight to 
secure international support for defending Australia against Axis attacks. From the beginning 
of his leadership, Canberra reporters reacted positively to the collegial tone of his news 
conferences; they were familiar with his background as the former State press union president 
who organised Australia’s first university classes for professional journalists. During the 
anxious days leading to the Pacific war, Curtin was given the opportunity to implement fully 
his media initiatives. The strategies succeeded as he and Don Rodgers, the new full-time 
Prime Ministerial press secretary, frequently briefed journalists about the grave developments 
signalling the imminent Japanese attacks. After broadcasting Australia’s first independent 
declaration of war, he used the fledgling radio services to communicate frequently to national 
and massive overseas audiences, unprecedented in their size and global locations. 
 
Along with instigating more Australian radio programs and foreign correspondent positions, 
he helped develop an internationally renowned film industry. For example, the Australian 
National Publicity Association opened in New York in 1941. Then the Government-
sponsored team of the 1942 film “Kokoda Front Line!” won the nation’s first Academy 
Award for a documentary. In 1943 the ALP achieved an unprecedented electorate landslide 
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because of Curtin’s novel radio campaign policy speech, his personal popularity and 
appealing advertisements focusing on his leadership. While the Murdoch and Packer news 
groups endorsed non-Labor candidates, Curtin’s campaign speech was positively portrayed in 
The Age, The Canberra Times, The Sydney Morning Herald and The West Australian. As a 
result of the remarkably interactive, overseas interviews held by John and Elsie Curtin, 
Australians secured more worldwide support for their role in the Pacific war in 1944. After 
global headlines announced his death on 5 July 1945, his WA funeral service became the first 
event to attract media crews from the eastern States and to have been broadcast across 
Australia. These findings indicated the success of a Prime Minister who made significant 
investments in the latest media technology, direct, public communications and respectful 
journalism relationships. 
 
To discover how he implemented his media strategies, the preceding discussion focused on 
three examples: his news conferences in early 1942; his international radio broadcast on 14 
March 1942; and his cinematic image. An investigation of wartime journalists’ diary notes, 
letters and oral histories revealed Curtin’s persuasive abilities to gain their support for his 
controversial decision to bring home the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions. Even though the 
troops’ movements were subject to wartime censorship, reporters appreciated his 
extraordinary confidences, understood his reasoned arguments and quickly backed his 
independent stance. Curtin’s global radio speech attracted favourable Allied press coverage 
because of his use of clear, simple and egalitarian rhetoric that was similar to Roosevelt’s 
celebrated fireside chats. In his newsreels, he projected an image of being both a forceful, 
democratic leader and a common man of the people. Nonetheless, the apparent effortless and 
spontaneous motion pictures were the result of meticulous rehearsals. After Curtin practised 
different gestures, postures and words, the film teams edited series of eye-level close-ups and 
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medium shots to convey an intimate, personal relationship between the Prime Minister and 
cinema audiences. By applying new press, radio and film strategies, Curtin inspired a nation 
to help win the Pacific war and provided a valuable model in Prime Ministerial-journalism 
relations. 
 
Photo captions 
Image One: 
After Curtin’s landslide election, The Sun’s Stuart Peterson published his cartoon in the 
Sydney newspaper on 24 August 1943. In Scrapbooks compiled by the Prime Minister’s 
office. John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley. Reference number JCPML00297/3. 
Courtesy of the John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library. 
 
Image Two: 
Australian Prime Minister John Curtin (seated) and his press secretary Don Rodgers (far 
right, behind Curtin) shared top-secret military news with Joseph Alexander of The Herald 
(right, with glasses and folded arms) and other reporters in Canberra, circa 1945. Records of 
the Curtin Family. Reference number JCPML00376/2. Courtesy of the John Curtin Prime 
Ministerial Library. 
 
Image Three: 
Curtin developed a close rapport with media producers and users, including during his British 
radio address in 1944. Records of the J S Battye Library of West Australian History. 
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Reference number BA499/22, 53436P. Courtesy State Library of Western Australia, The 
Battye Library. 
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1 I would like to thank the Curtin University Humanities Graduate Studies Office. Also I 
appreciate the support of Associate Professors Bobbie Oliver and Steve Mickler, as well as 
the John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library. 
 
2 Supportive press editorials were published to announce the new Prime Minister in the 
following: The Advertiser, The Age, The Argus, The Brisbane Telegraph, The Canberra 
Times, The Courier-Mail, The Daily Mirror, The Herald, The Mercury, The Sun, The Sydney 
Morning Herald and The West Australian (Australian Prime Minister’s Office 4-9 October 
1941). 
 
3 Curtin’s editorial generated positive news coverage in The Age, The Argus, The Brisbane 
Telegraph, The Canberra Times, The Daily Telegraph, The Herald, The Mirror and The Sun 
(Australian Prime Minister’s Office 27 December 1941 – 1 January 1942). 
 
4 This study found Curtin’s US broadcast received positive coverage in The Age, The 
Canberra Times, The Mercury, The Sydney Morning Herald and The West Australian 
(Australian Prime Minister’s Office 16 March 1942). 
 
5 For example, Curtin’s death was announced on the front pages of The Age, The Canberra 
Times and The Sydney Morning Herald on 6 July 1945. The West Australian led with 
classified advertisements, consistent with its normal layouts, and the announcement was 
published on 5 July 1945, page seven. Front-page tributes also appeared in The Chicago 
Daily Tribune, The New York Times and The Washington Post on 5 July 1945. 
